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Abstract
Chaotic systems have been broadly exploited through the last two decades to build
encryption methods. Recently, two new image encryption schemes have been pro-
posed, where the encryption process involves a permutation operation and an XOR-
like transformation of the shu²ed pixels, which are controlled by three chaotic sys-
tems. This paper discusses some defects of the schemes and how to break them with
a chosen-plaintext attack.
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1 Introduction
When we think about exchanging information we are very interested in ¯nd-
ing a way to make it fast and secure. Modern telecommunications technolo-
gies allow to send and receive ¯les, images, and data in a relatively short
time depending on the bandwidth available. Nowadays, the use of traditional
symmetric and asymmetric cryptography is the way to secure the informa-
tion exchange [1,2]. However, applications involving digital images and videos
demand other encryption schemes. Indeed, the bulky size and the large re-
dundancy of uncompressed videos/images make it necessary to look for new
methods to deal with those features in order to facilitate the integration of
the encryption in the whole processing procedure. For recent surveys on image
and video encryption, please refer to [3{6].
The main features of chaotic systems (sensitivity to initial conditions, ergod-
icity, mixing property, simple analytic description and high complex behavior)
make them very interesting to design new cryptosystems. Image encryption
is an area where chaos has been broadly exploited. In fact, chaotic systems
have been used to mask plain-images through XOR-like substitution opera-
tions [7], spatial permutation [8] or the combination of both techniques [9].
This paper is focused on two image encryption schemes proposed in [10, 11].
In both papers the image encryption is based on a secret permutation derived
from the logistic map, and a masking of the gray-scale values of the shu²ed
pixels with a keystream generated from one or two chaotic systems. The only
di®erence between the two encryption schemes is that in [10] two chaotic sys-
tems (Lorenz and Chen's systems) are used to generate the keystream, while
in [11] only one hyper-chaotic system is used. Because such a di®erence is
independent of the security, we only focus on the cryptanalysis of the scheme
proposed in [10].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The scheme under study is
described brie°y in the next section. In Section 3 some important problems of
the cryptosystem are remarked. Then, a chosen-plaintext attack is described
in Section 4 along with some experimental results. In the last section the
conclusion is given.
2 The encryption scheme
Assuming that the size of the plain-image I is M £N and the cipher-image is
I0, the encryption scheme proposed in [10] can be described by the following
two procedures. Please note that we use di®erent notations from the original
ones in [10] to get a simpler and clearer description.
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² Shu²ing procedure
In this procedure, the plain-image I is permuted to form an intermedi-
ate image I¤ according to a total shu²ing matrix P¤, which is derived by
pseudo-randomly permuting the rows and columns of the original position
matrix P = [(i; j)]. The pseudo-random row and column permutations are
generated by iterating the logistic map xn+1 = 4xn(1 ¡ xn) from a given
initial condition x0.
² Masking procedure
In this procedure, the intermediate image I¤ is further masked by a
keystream fB(i)gMNi=1 as follows: 8i = 1 »MN , I 0(i) = I¤(i)©B(i)©I 0(i¡1),
where I(i), I 0(i) denote the i-th pixels of I¤ and I0 (counted from left to right
and from top to bottom), respectively, and I 0(0) = 128.
The keystream fB(i)gMNi=1 is generated by iterating the Lorenz and Chen
systems and doing some postprocessing on all the 6 chaotic variables (the
¯rst N0 iterations of the Lorenz system and the ¯rstM0 iterations of Chen's
system are discarded to enhance the security). Because our cryptanalysis
succeeds regardless of the keystream's generation process, we ignore this
part and readers are referred to Sec. 2.3 of [10] for details.
In [10], it is claimed that the secret key includes the initial values of the
Lorenz and Chen systems and the number of initial iterations N0, M0. It is
quite strange why the initial condition of the logistic map is not claimed to be
part of the key, since the image encryption scheme is based on \a new total
shu²ing algorithm" (as can be seen in the title of [10]). In this cryptanalysis
paper, we assume that the initial condition of the logistic map is also part of
the key. We believe it is also the original intention of the authors of [10]. In
addition, note that both P¤ and fB(i)gMNi=1 are independent of the plaintext
and ciphertext, so they can be used as an equivalent key.
3 Design weaknesses
In this section, we discuss some defects of the scheme under study.
3.1 Low sensitivity to the change of plain-image
It is well known that the ciphertext of a secure encryption scheme should
be very sensitive to the change of plaintext [12, Rule 9]. Unfortunately, the
encryption scheme under study fails to satisfy this requirement. Given two
plain-images I0 and I1 with only one pixel di®erence at the position (i; j),
the di®erence will be permuted to a new position (i¤; j¤) according to the
shu²ing matrix P¤. Then, because all plain-pixels before (i¤; j¤) are identical
3
(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 1. Illustration of the low sensitivity to the change of the plain-image: (a) the
¯rst plain-image I0; (b) the second plain-image I1 (only the center pixel is di®erent
from I0); (c) the di®erential cipher-image I00 © I01.
for the two plain-images, the ciphertexts will also be identical. This shows
the low sensitivity of the image encryption scheme to changes in the plain-
image. Figure 1 gives an example of this problem. It can be seen how the
di®erential cipher-image is equal to zero for any pixel before (i¤; j¤) and equal
to a constant value after that position.
3.2 Reduced key space
As claimed in [10], N0 and M0 are also part of the key. However, from an
attacker's point of view, he/she only needs to guess the chaotic states after
the N0 and M0 chaotic iterations as the initial conditions of the Lorenz and
Chen's systems. In this way, N0 and M0 are removed from the key and the
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key space is reduced.
3.3 Problem with chaotic iterations of Lorenz' and Chen's systems
In [10], the authors did not say anything about the time step ¿ of iterating
the Lorenz and Chen systems. However, the randomness of the keystream
fB(i)gMNi=1 is tightly dependent on the value of the time step. As an ex-
treme example, if ¿ = 10¡20, we will get a keystream of identical elements
(according to the algorithm described in Section 2.3 of [10]). As a matter
of fact, the value of ¿ is dependent on the multiplication factor 1013 oc-
curring in Step 4 of the encryption process (see Section 2.3 of [10]): xi =
mod((abs(xi)¡ Floor(abs(xi)))£ 1013; 256).
3.4 Low encryption speed
Because the chaotic iterations of Lorenz' and Chen's systems involve com-
plicated numerical di®erential functions, the encryption speed is expected to
be very slow compared with other traditional ciphers. To asses this fact, we
derived a modi¯ed encryption scheme from the original one by replacing the
Lorenz and Chen systems with the logistic map, and then compared the en-
cryption speeds of the two cryptosystems. Both cryptosystems were imple-
mented using MATLAB on a PC with a 1.6 GHz processor and 512 MB of
RAM. For images of size 256£256, the typical encryption time for the original
cryptosystem in [10] was around 5.8 s, while the modi¯ed cryptosystem based
on the logistic map required on average around 1.2 s to encrypt an image. The
experiments have clearly shown that using continuous chaotic systems can
drastically reduce the encryption speed. Since there are also no other obvious
merits in using continuous chaotic systems rather than a simple discrete-time
chaotic map, the use of the Lorenz and Chen systems in the image encryption
scheme under study is unnecessary. Instead, these continuous chaotic systems
can be replaced by a simpler discrete-time chaotic map without compromising
the security.
4 Chosen-plaintext attack
When a variation of stream cipher is created, as in the case under study,
obtaining the keystream is totally equivalent to obtaining the key whenever
di®erent plain-images are encrypted using the same key. In this section, we
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present a chosen-plaintext attack which allows to recover both the keystream
and the shu²ing matrix.
Let us choose a plain-image I1 such that 8i; j = 1 » MN , I1(i) = I1(j) = a.
In this case, the shu²ing part does not work, so we have I¤1 = I1. Then, we can
recover the keystream as follows: 8i = 1 »MN , B(i) = I1(i)©I 01(i)©I 01(i¡1).
After removing the masking part, we can try to recover the shu²ing matrix.
According to the general cryptanalysis on permutation-only ciphers in [13],
only dlog256(MN)e chosen plain-images are needed to recover the shu²ing
matrix P¤. In total we need dlog256(MN)e+1 chosen plain-images to perform
this chosen-plaintext attack.
With the aim of verifying the proposed attack, several experiments have been
done. One of the examples is shown in Fig. 2, where the images are of size 256£
256 and the secret key involved is shown in Table 1. As it was mentioned above,
the shu²ing process is broken using log256(MN) = 2 chosen plain-images,
while the masking procedure cryptanalysis requires one chosen plain-image.
The three chosen plain-images allow to decipher the cipher-image included in
Fig. 2a and thus to get the corresponding plain-image (Fig. 2b), even when
the secret key is unknown. To conclude this section, it is necessary to point
out that the chosen-plaintext attack proposed here was independently worked
out, although a similar attack was reported by other researchers in [14] to
cryptanalyze [11].
Table 1
Key value used in the experiment.
x1(0) x2(0) x3(0) x4(0) x5(0) x6(0) N0 M0 x0
0:3 ¡0:4 1:2 10:2 ¡3:5 4:4 3000 2000 0:4
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. The result of the chosen-plaintext attack: (a) a cipher-image encrypted with
the key as shown in Table 1; (b) the decrypted plain-image using the equivalent key¡
P¤; fB(i)gMNi=1
¢
obtained via the chosen-plaintext attack.
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5 Conclusions
The security of the image encryption scheme proposed in [10] has been ana-
lyzed in detail. The cryptanalytic results are also valid for the other scheme
proposed in [11]. It has been shown that the equivalent secret key can be re-
covered in a chosen-plaintext attack with only dlog256(MN)e+1 chosen plain-
images. In addition, some other defects have also been distinguished in the
scheme under study. Among those defects, it is necessary to emphasize the one
concerning the encryption speed, since it informs about the non-convenience of
continuous-time chaotic systems for implementing fast encryption procedures.
The weak security properties frustrate the usage of the scheme in practice.
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